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The Worker Exposure Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (WE-FMEA) is a new approach to quantitatively 
evaluate worker risks from possible failures of co-located 
equipment in the complex environment of a magnetic or 
inertial fusion experiment.  For next-step experiments 
such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental 
Reactor (ITER) or the National Ignition Facility (NIF), 
the systems and equipment will be larger, handle more 
throughput or power, and will, in general, be more robust 
than past experiments.  These systems and equipment are 
necessary to operate the machine, but the rooms are 
congested with equipment, piping, and cables, which 
poses a new level of hazard for workers who will perform 
hands-on maintenance.  The WE-FMEA systematically 
analyzes the nearby equipment and the work environment 
for equipment failure or inherent hazards, and then 
develops exposure scenarios.  Once identified, the 
exposure scenarios are evaluated for the worker hazards 
and quantitative worker risk is calculated.  Then risk 
scenarios are quantitatively compared to existing 
statistical data on worker injuries; high-risk scenarios 
can be identified and addressed in more detail to 
determine the proper means to reduce, mitigate, or 
protect against the hazard.  The WE-FMEA approach is 
described and a cooling system maintenance example is 
given.
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Safety assessment techniques currently used by 
industrial safety professionals tend to be qualitative; they 
are used mainly to identify hazards and the personal 
protective equipment needed for deterministic protection 
against the hazards.  This approach is typified by the 
29CFR1910.134 technique that directs a walk-through of 
the workplace to identify task hazards.  The foremost tool 
used for the qualitative approach is the Job Hazard 
Analysis (JHA) that deconstructs a task into its major 
parts or actions to identify the hazards of energy or 
hazardous material exposure.1,2  The JHA is quite useful 
in developing safety procedures for tasks and 
recommending personal protective equipment for workers 
to use during performance of tasks.  For the state-of-the-
art JHA, the industrial safety professional judges the 
degree of hazard subjectively and protective measures are 
adopted based on the safety professional’s intuition, 
guidance from best industry practice, regulation, or some 
combination of all of these.  The JHA can also identify 
the hazard for follow-up detailed analysis. 
The JHA is a proven analysis tool that has worked 
well for many situations that require workplace safety 
assessment.3  The JHA has been used for decades; 
however, the JHA focuses on the task the worker is 
performing.  In a simple working environment, such as a 
large shop with few indirect or proximate hazards apart 
from the task at hand, the JHA performs well and gives a 
complete analysis of hazards.  For example, in a 
manufacturing plant with defined work areas, workers 
have the primary concerns of overexertion, falls, tool 
handling injuries, hand wounds, cuts and pinches from 
moving parts, and impacts from work pieces;4 there are 
few secondary hazards of concern.  In a complex working 
environment, such as a fusion experiment, a particle 
accelerator, or a power plant, there can be a number of 
other hazards peripheral to the task at hand.  In such an 
environment, the workers access areas that pose multiple 
hazards from systems and equipment that are in close 
proximity to the workers, but are not part of the work to 
be performed.  These nearby systems or equipment may 
or may not be de-energized.  Such indirect or proximate 
hazards are not typically included in the JHA.  The JHA 
may address general issues about the work environment, 
such as high room air temperature or radiation exposure, 
but this is not sufficient to provide comprehensive worker 
protection in a complex fusion facility.   
Other worker safety assessment methods have been 
developed in the past decade, primarily to evaluate 
worker risks during environmental cleanup tasks.5-8  The 
worker safety methods developed in the 1990’s for 
environmental cleanup focus on the consequence 
assessment aspects of worker exposure to the process 
hazards, namely radioactive, toxicological, and mixed 
wastes that are handled and packaged in remediation 
work.  The safety concerns in cleanup work arise from the 
task at hand, such as dealing with flammable gases in 
waste drums, potential fission criticality of the waste 
materials, and hazardous material exposure during 
handling.  Once again, the focus is on the primary hazards 
facing the workers.  Perhaps the most definitive 
publication on worker safety methods is Harms-
Ringdahl;9 it also focuses on the primary hazards of the 
task at hand.  The new worker safety approach described 
here augments these past approaches since its focus is on 
peripheral or secondary hazards nearby rather than the 
primary hazards of the energy sources and hazardous 
materials in the task at hand.  While these primary 
hazards usually have the greatest influence on worker 
safety, if the workers are properly following their 
procedures and using personal protective equipment – as 
we expect in a first of a kind fusion facility – then 
secondary hazards that have not been analyzed or guarded 
against can have the greatest influence on their safety. 
II.  WORKER EXPOSURE FMEA METHOD 
To address the hazards of proximate systems and 
equipment, a modification to the system-level Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)10 is proposed.  The 
FMEA is already a proven, respected technique in the 
many industries.11-14  Fusion designs have also made good 
use of the FMEA.15  The analysis tool is known for its 
systematic evaluation and ranking of faults that can occur 
in the system under study.  The traditional FMEA is 
applied to all the major components of a given system to 
be evaluated, even when the system components are in 
multiple rooms or floors of a facility. To address worker 
safety, the system-level FMEA has been modified to 
identify all of the components posing potential hazards to 
the worker.  For this application, the system-level FMEA 
approach is used not with a system component boundary; 
instead the Worker Exposure FMEA (WE-FMEA) 
analyzes only the components that are near the worker’s 
location (i.e., within the same room or perhaps within 
~10 m of the worker).  The set of components close to the 
worker will almost always reside in a number of different 
systems; the set also includes those distant components 
whose failure can directly affect the worker’s location, 
such as ventilation fans.  Therefore, WE-FMEA treats the 
proximate components from a number of systems, instead 
of the components from one entire system.  The WE-
FMEA further alters the traditional system FMEA to only 
consider equipment failure modes that can present an 
immediate hazard to the worker rather than all known 
equipment failure modes.  Also, the WE-FMEA failure 
effects are the injury consequences to the worker rather 
than component failure effects to its parent system.  The 
WE-FMEA uses the systematic nature of FMEA to 
identify hazardous events arising from component failures 
and records a preliminary quantification of the probability 
of the component failures.  With the type of industrial 
injury and the probability of component failure identified, 
the risk to the worker can be calculated.   
Personnel injuries can vary a great deal in the actual 
damage inflicted.  Classifying injuries can be performed 
based on the part of the body affected, the severity of the 
injury, the ability to heal or recover from the injury, 
physical impairments that may result from the injury, or 
other factors.  Due to this variety of classifications, 
typifying injuries for assessing the human injury 
consequences of a component failure is problematic.  For 
this paper, the ‘Abbreviated Injury Scale’ from 
emergency medicine16 has been used as a starting point to 
categorize injury severity.  Potential injuries are 
qualitatively ranked as one of six levels, defined here as:  
1. Minor Injury (MI): first aid cases or injuries that do not 
result in lost work days, the worker is released to return to 
the job after receiving aid (i.e., contusions, abrasions, 
lacerations, mild sprains, etc.);  
2. Moderate Injury (MoI): cases where the worker leaves 
the job to obtain medical treatment but does not require 
emergency medical help (large or deep lacerations, 
muscle strain, sprains, small burn areas, etc.).  A MoI may 
result in lost work time;  
3. Serious Injury (SI): worker injuries that require 
emergency medical help and result in one or more lost 
work days (individual bone fractures, mild concussion 
such as from a standing fall to the floor, modest area 
burns, very large lacerations, penetrating wound with 
mild organ damage, some blood loss, etc.);  
4. Severe Injury (SeI): worker injuries that require 
immediate emergency medical help and result in perhaps 
a week or longer of lost work days (moderate area burns, 
many broken bones from a fall from modest height, 
concussion, mild eye damage, moderate organ damage, 
large blood loss, etc.); 
5. Critical Injury (CI): worker injuries that require 
immediate emergency medical help, results in weeks of 
lost work days, and may not ever return to that type of 
work again (such as deep or large area burns, electric 
shock, severe organ damage, memory loss from 
asphyxiation, eye loss, injuries from a fall from height, 
very large blood loss, etc.); 
6. Unsurvivable or Fatal Injury (FI): the sustained injuries 
result in immediate fatality or are the direct cause of 
delayed fatality (such as organ damage to the point of 
organ failure, brain trauma, extreme blood loss, high 
percentage body burns, electrocution, fatal fall, etc.).   
The WE-FMEA analysis steps are to first identify the 
maintenance or other plant activity to be analyzed and the 
work location within in the facility.  Next, the literature 
should be surveyed to determine the types of hazards and 
injuries that have occurred when performing the same 
task or similar tasks in similar facilities; in this case, other 
fusion experiments, particle accelerators, or other 
facilities with a system similar to the one under 
consideration.  Next, the personnel safety master logic 
diagram17 or other methods, such as checklists, can be 
used to identify the types of energy sources and hazards in 
the vicinity of the worker’s activity (maintenance, 
calibration, etc.).  With this information, the pieces of 
equipment and their failure modes that could create local 
hazards in a ~10 m-diameter sphere around the worker are 
systematically identified.  Next, any remote equipment 
necessary for worker protection that has not been 
addressed already in the JHA must be identified.  
Example equipment could include ventilating fans, 
ventilation dampers, chillers, area monitors, circuit 
breakers, lights, etc.  These equipment items are recorded 
on a worksheet similar to a traditional FMEA worksheet.  
The worksheet entries are evaluated for these ‘secondary 
risks’ to the workers.  If the secondary risks are low, no 
additional safety provisions are required.  If the secondary 
risks are high, then the analyst must assess if any of the 
personal protective equipment (PPE) issued for primary 
hazard protection will offer some protection for the 
secondary hazard.  If the PPE also protects the worker 
from secondary hazards, then the task is complete.  If not, 
then the analyst must identify the additional means that 
are needed to mitigate or reduce the secondary risks by 
using engineering or administrative controls on the task.  
The WE-FMEA must be used in concert with a JHA or 
other worker task based assessment to determine the 
protective measures (buddy system, camera surveillance, 
radio, etc.) and protective equipment the worker will be 
using for protection from primary and secondary hazards.   
III.  WE-FMEA EXAMPLE 
As an example of this method, the WE-FMEA is 
applied to a representative task of a yearly, 4-hour 
calibration of a cooling water instrument in the first wall 
(FW) cooling system of a magnetic fusion experiment.  
The cooling systems for the experiment use water, similar 
to the ITER design.  The instrument maintenance task 
would be performed in a cooling system room that 
contains the main cooling equipment and piping for 
divertor and FW cooling.  Fig. 1 shows a suggested room 
layout for the example task.  Since fusion designers are 
aware that placing instrumentation in a high magnetic 
field can lead to inaccurate readings, there is an 
expectation that the magnetic field strength will not be 
high in the work area.  Both cooling systems have piping, 
pumps, valves and heat exchangers near the worker’s 
location.  There is a residual radiation field from the 
activation in the coolant water.  The coolant system 
equipment room also operates at a somewhat elevated 
temperature and with high noise due to the large pump 
motors, assumed to be in the 4 to 13 kV size range.  There 
may or may not be plasma heating conduits routed 
through the room, which presents the possibility that 
leakage electromagnetic radiation from the conduits could 
be present in the room.  Design details of the room are not 
complete for this example; some assumptions have been 
made.  The FW cooling system itself is assumed to have 
been “safed”, that is, cooled down to room temperature 
and depressurized.  This is a safety precaution for the 
personnel and it also serves as a calibration point in the 
instrument calibration process (i.e., “zeroing” the 
instrument).  The adjacent cooling systems are assumed to 
be active since there must be active cooling for decay heat 
removal from the tokamak.  Typical plasma operation 
could require the divertor cooling system to operate at 
150 C at 4 MPa; however, the cooling system might be 
operating at a reduced value when only removing decay 
heat.  Even at reduced heat transfer conditions, the system 
will be pressurized to suppress coolant boiling.  Perhaps 
the coolant parameters in decay heat removal mode will 
not create steam during a pipe breach event, but spraying 
60 C liquid water still constitutes serious burn and ocular 
hazards. 
Fig. 1.  Illustrative room layout for the WE-FEMA 
example. 
Following the WE-FMEA steps outlined above, the 
US Department of Energy (DOE) Occurrence Reporting 
and Processing System database was searched for events 
related to pressure instruments.  The results were several 
events of not securing power to the instrument before 
starting work, leaks and spills associated with the 
instrument work, safety issues of working at height, and 
some burns sustained from nearby piping.  The first three 
concerns - securing power, handling coolant leaks/spills, 
and working at height – are expected to be addressed in 
the JHA.  The fourth concern, burn injuries from nearby 
piping, is exactly the type of issue that the WE-FMEA 
can identify and a JHA may or may not identify because 
the primary work is on an instrument and pipe at room 
temperature.  Calibrating the pressure instrument can also 
mean exposure to radiation in the coolant from activated 
corrosion products, and the potential for skin 
contamination if the FW coolant leaks.  The JHA would 
probably specify anti-contamination clothing – gloves, 
tyvek coveralls, booties, possibly a hood, and some type 
of face shield to protect against splashing.  The workers 
would probably not require breathing apparatus since the 
task is conducted at room temperature and pressure and is 
not expected to generate any gaseous or particulate 
emissions.  If the workers are on a tall scaffold to access 
the pressure instrument, they will also have fall protection 
equipment specified.   
The WE-FMEA example for FW cooling system 
instrument calibration is given in Table I.  Several 
possible energy and hazardous material releases were 
identified when considering a generic equipment room.  
The piping in adjacent systems was evaluated based on an 
assumption that the worker is > 1 m outward from a break 
location.  As a first approximation, the injury 
consequences are considered to decrease as the workers’ 
distance from the breach increases; the 1 m is a distance 
that should protect against pressure jet effects.  The WE-
FMEA shows that steam or hot water leaks could occur, 
albeit at a low probability over the time frame of the task.  
The expected anti-contamination clothing for this 
instrument calibration task is deemed inadequate to 
protect against high temperature and pressure water 
release, or steam release, in the area.   
The American Petroleum Institute (API) has provided 
some worker safety guidance on steam releases and 
exposure.18  When modest pressure steam is released, the 
steam jet fans out and slows within about a meter from 
the break, and the steam cools to 100 C just after exiting 
the breach.  The steam also heats up the room air.  At a 
concentration of 20% steam in the air, the steam/air 
mixture cools to about 60 C.  Using 60 C as the minimum 
temperature for human burn injury from steam/air 
exposure, the API determined the steam-affected areas 
around a breach location and developed simple relations 
to estimate these areas.  For continuous steam leaks the 
affected floor area is calculated by the formula A = 0.6(x), 
where x is the steam release rate in pounds/second, and A 
is floor area covered by 20% or more steam, in square 
feet.  Presumably, the affected height is the floor-to-
ceiling height.  For our modeling purposes the floor area 
was assumed to be rectangular and centered around the 
break location.  Considering water systems, the generally 
accepted leak rate is up to 50 gallons/minute, and pipe 
ruptures are greater than that value.19  As a first 
approximation, converting a 50 gallons/minute water leak 
into a steam leak is ~3 kg/s.  Using the API formula with 
this leakage gives 0.37 m2, or an affected floor area of 
0.6 m by 0.6 m.  For the worker > 1 m distant from the 
pipe, there is no immediate threat, or no injury (NI).  For 
a pipe rupture, what the API calls an instantaneous steam 
release, the affected area equation is A = (63.317)(x0.6384), 
where A is the area in square feet and x is the release 
mass in pounds.  A rupture release could begin at ~3 kg 
but will typically be much larger, such as 455 kg.  For the 
455 kg case, the affected area is about 22 by 22 meters.  
For this example, the 22x22 m floor area will be the 
assumed value for pipe ruptures and shell breaches, such 
as pump bodies and valve bodies.  The heat exchanger 
shell breach is assumed to allow a larger release and will 
therefore pose a higher hazard.  The worker is assumed to 
be less than 10 m from adjacent system pumps, valves, 
and heat exchangers in the example. 
Exposure to steam will result in thermal burns and 
steam inhalation injury, as well as activation product 
exposure.  The severity of steam injury is related to the 
temperature of the steam, the duration of exposure, the 
distance of the worker from the source of the steam, and 
the ability of the worker to escape the steam.20  Burns are 
judged based on the percent of body surface area (BSA) 
affected, and the age of the injured person.20  For 
example, the 45 to 64 year-old age group results are: 10% 
BSA has a ~1% mortality, 20% BSA has a 5% mortality, 
30% BSA has a 15% mortality, 40% BSA has a 20% 
mortality, 50% BSA has a 60% mortality, 60% BSA has 
an 80% mortality, 70% BSA has a 90% morality and 
higher BSAs have 100% mortality.  The “rule of nines” is 
used by medical personnel to estimate BSA.  An adult’s 
arm is 9% of their BSA, the front and the back of the 
trunk of the body are each 18%, and each leg is 18%.  The 
face is 9%, and the crotch is 1%.  For an initial 
estimation, the closer a worker is to a steam leak, the 
greater the steam engulfment and the higher the BSA 
affected.  As a first approximation, 70% BSA and higher 
is assigned the FI level, 50-60% BSA is CI, 30-40% BSA 
is SeI, 10-20% BSA is SI.  Under 10% BSA, not only 
does the human body have high capacity to survive a 
burn, but medical science has advanced to aid the burn 
patient; no mortality is given.  Inhaling steam usually 
creates pulmonary injuries that exacerbate the skin burn 
injuries.  The medical viewpoint is that steam has more 
damage potential than hot, dry air.  The additional heat 
deposition from inhaled steam leads to hypoxia, anoxia, 
edema, and shock.20  Hence, the medical community 
views steam as more dangerous than smoke or hot air; 
with the advances in burn care some medical personnel 
believe that inhalation injury to the lungs is the main 
cause of mortality in burn patients.21,22  The steam can 
damage lung tissues and lead to pulmonary congestion, 
edema and pneumonia in the lungs, complicating recovery 
from skin burn injuries.  If the worker or workers are on a 
scaffold to work at height, evading a steam release is not 
possible in a timely manner.  This was tragically shown to 
be the case when a steam pipe failed at the Oconee 
nuclear power plant in 1982.23
TABLE I.  Example WE-FMEA for FW cooling water instrument calibration. 
Proximate 
Component 
and System 
Potential 
Component 
Failure Mode 
Potential Causes 
of Component 
Failure 
Potential 
Hazards to 
Workers 
Frequency of 
Component 
Failure 
Worker 
Risk 
Comments / 
Recommended 
Preventive 
Actions 
Coolant piping  
For Divertor 
Piping leak Erosion-corrosion 
corrosion, fatigue, 
weld flaw 
Steam inhalation, 
jet exposure, 
rad. exposure 
2.5E-10/h-m, 
4 hour task, 
1.2 m x 2 lines. 2.4E-09 NI 
> 1 m distant worker is 
not at risk from 0.6 x 
0.6 m leak. 
Coolant piping  
For Divertor 
Piping rupture Embrittlement, 
weld failure 
Steam immersion, 
inhalation, rad. 
exposure 
2.5E-11/h-m, 
4 hour task, 
22 m x 2 lines. 4.4E-09 CI 
< 10 m distant worker is 
at risk.  ‘Leak before 
break’ may warn 
worker. 
Coolant pump 
For Divertor 
Pump casing 
leak 
Erosion-corrosion, 
corrosion, fatigue, 
overstress 
Steam inhalation, 
jet exposure, 
rad. exposure 
3.6E-05/h 
4 hour task. 1.44E-04 NI 
> 1 m distant worker is 
not at risk from 0.6 x 
0.6 m leak. 
Coolant pump 
for Divertor 
Pump seal 
failure, loss of 
coolant accident 
Seal water flow 
failure, vibration, 
wear 
Steam inhalation, 
rad. exposure 
7E-08/pump-h,  
4 hour task. 
Assume 22 m x 22 m 
affected. 
2.8E-07 SeI 
< 10 m distant worker is 
at risk.  ‘Leak before 
break’ may warn 
worker. 
Coolant pump 
for Divertor 
Pump flywheel 
thrown 
Shaft fatigue, 
bearing seizure, 
flywheel fatigue 
Exposure to 
shrapnel 
< 1E-06/year  
or 1E-10/h, 
4 hour task. 4E-10 MoI 
Assumed failure rate, 
assumed injury severity 
Coolant pump 
For Divertor 
Pump impeller 
thrown 
Shaft fatigue, 
bearing seizure, 
impeller fatigue, 
impeller unbalance 
Exposure to 
shrapnel, steam 
immersion, 
inhalation, rad. 
exposure 
< 1E-06/year 
or 1E-10/h, 
4 hour task; assume 
22 m x 22 m affected. 
4E-10 SI 
< 10 m distant worker is 
at risk 
Coolant pump 
for Divertor 
Pump motor 
fire 
Insulation 
breakdown, 
foreign material 
intrusion 
Exposure to 
smoke, hot 
combustion 
products 
1.8E-07/h, 
4 hour task. Assume 
room fills w/smoke. 
7.2E-07 MoI 
Alarms for timely 
evacuation 
Coolant pump 
for Divertor 
Lubricant leak Fatigue cracking, 
vibration 
Exposure to hot 
lubricant, may also 
be mist of toxic 
material 
1E-06/h, 
assumed value. 
4 hour task. 4E-06 SI 
Assumes use of 
nonflammable lubricant, 
60 C, ~ 0.4 MPa.  Mist 
is assumed to spread. 
Coolant pump 
for Divertor 
Noise of 
operation 
Normal operation Acoustic energy 
exposure 
1,
ambient environment 
1 MI Assume JHA specifies 
hearing protection 
Coolant pump 
for Divertor 
Exhaust heat 
from operation 
Normal operation Exposure to 
elevated room air 
temperature 
1,
ambient environment 
1 MI Assume exposures in 
task environments are 
limited [e.g., ref. 24] 
Heat Exchanger 
for Divertor 
Shell leak Erosion-corrosion 
corrosion, fatigue, 
weld flaw 
Hot water jet, 
possible radiation  
exposure 
1E-08/h, 
4 hour task. 4E-08 NI 
> 1 m distant worker is 
not at risk from 0.6 x 
06 m leak 
Heat Exchanger 
for Divertor 
Shell rupture Erosion, 
embrittlement, 
weld failure 
Hot water release, 
possible 
rad. exposure 
1E-10/h,  
4 hour task. 
Assume 22 m x 22 m 
affected. 
4E-10 FI 
< 10 m distant worker is 
fatally injured.  ‘Leak 
before break’ may warn 
worker. 
Coolant 
instrument for 
Divertor 
Leak Fatigue, weld flaw Steam inhalation, 
jet, radiation 
exposure 
1E-07/h, 
4 hour task. 4E-07 NI 
> 1 m distant worker is 
not at risk 
Coolant 
instrument for 
Divertor 
Ejection under 
pressure/rupture 
Fatigue cracking, 
weld failure 
Exposure to debris 
missile, steam 
inhalation, 
radiation exposure 
~ 1E-04/year  
or 1E-08/hour, 
4 hour task. 
Assume ~ 10% 
chance worker is 
struck. 
4E-09 SeI 
10% is an overestimate 
of primary impact plus 
ricochets. 
Isolation valve 
for Divertor 
Leak past the 
stem 
Valve packing 
wear, foreign 
material intrusion 
on valve stem 
Steam inhalation, 
jet exposure, 
radiation exposure 
1E-06/h, 
4 hour task. 4E-06 NI 
> 1 m distant worker is 
not at risk from 0.6 x 
06 m leak 
Isolation valve 
for Divertor 
Valve body 
rupture 
Erosion-corrosion, 
corrosion, fatigue, 
casting flaw 
Steam immersion, 
inhalation, rad. 
exposure 
1E-10/h, 
4 hour task. 22 m x 
22 m. 
4E-10 SeI 
< 10 m distant worker is 
injured 
TABLE I.  Continued 
Affective 
Component 
and System 
Potential 
Component 
Failure Mode 
Potential Causes 
of Component 
Failure 
Potential 
Hazards to 
Workers 
Frequency of 
Component 
Failure 
Worker 
Risk 
Comments /  
Recommended 
Preventive 
Actions 
Ventilation fan 
for room 
ventilation 
system 
fails to continue 
to run 
motor fault, drive 
fault, blade 
imbalance 
Exposure to 
elevated room air 
temperature 
3E-05/h 
4 hour task 
1.2E-04 MI May have redundant 
ventilation system, 
limits to work 
environment 
temperature [ref 24] 
Ventilation 
damper for 
room 
ventilation 
system 
fails closed linkage fault, 
solenoid failure 
Exposure to 
elevated room air 
temperature 
3E-07/h 
4 hour task 
1.2E-06 MI May have redundant 
ventilation system, 
limits to work 
environment 
temperature [ref 24] 
Worker Risk 
Summations 
No Injury, NI = 1.5E-04      MI = 1.0     Accident/Injury risk, MoI+Si+SeI+CI = 5E-06 over 4 h     Fatality risk, FI = 4E-10 over 4 h 
Note:  Failure rate values were taken from references 25-28. 
Some of the failures in Table I could result in debris 
being expelled from rotating equipment, or ejection of 
objects under pressure.  In enclosed concrete rooms that 
are traversed by piping, it is possible to ricochet debris 
from piping, structural columns, cable trays or the 
walls/floor.  Thus, the probability of impact should be 
increased over the initial ‘line-of-flight’ impact 
probability that was coarsely estimated using a 2S
geometry at 10 m radius and then ratioing an assumed 
human profile area to the hemisphere area.  There are 
very sophisticated means available to determine the 
probability of impact from such debris, and one such 
method has been used for the National Ignition Facility in 
the case of a large capacitor failure that emits debris.29
The level of detail of the example in this paper did not 
warrant analysis using a ricochet tracking computer code. 
The results given in Table I are on a per worker basis, 
although the task may specify two workers to meet the 
‘buddy system’ best practice in radiological work.  From 
Fig. 1 and an initial review, the reader may believe that 
the risks are low and that passive components like pipes 
and heat exchangers do not pose hazards.  Fission power 
plant experiences do not support this conclusion; there 
have been incidents that have caused extreme 
consequences and “near misses”, meaning that no one 
was injured simply because they were not nearby when a 
failure occurred.30-32  Overall, the risk values in Table I 
require interpretation since most of the individual events 
are low probability.  The DOE Fusion Safety Standard33
has stated that workers shall be protected from routine 
industrial hazards to a level commensurate with that of 
comparable industrial facilities, and that fusion facilities 
shall comply with US Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration regulations to control industrial hazards.   
Occupational safety data from a comparable 
industrial activity, in this case fission power, can be used 
as a comparison point to the WE-FMEA findings.  The  
US fission power industry has had a recent publication of 
occupational safety data,34 that were compiled by the US 
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO).  Yearly 
aggregate values for lost work time injuries, injuries 
resulting in restricted work, and fatalities (combined 
under the term “accidents”) for nuclear power plants have 
been given in Table II.  However, the accident data are 
not divided into the same level of resolution as the 
predictions in Table I.  As a first effort to allow a 
comparison, using past ratios of fatalities to injuries of 
0.6% in the 1980’s,35 and assuming a decrease to 0.45% 
in the 1990’s and ~0.3% from INPO data in the 2000’s 
produces some results.  As an initial point of comparison, 
the accident/injury (MoI + SI + SeI + CI) values are 
compared to the Table II worker accident risk value, and 
FI values are compared to the worker fatality risk value.   
From Table I, this example task of one instrument 
calibration for one system gave a fatality probability of 
4E-10 over 4 hours, or a rate of 1E-10 fatality/hour.  From 
Table II, the overall five-year average for nuclear power 
plant workers performing all plant tasks is 5E-09 fatality 
per hour, thus the example task is ~2% of the annual risk.  
The worker accident probability sum from the example 
task is 5E-06 over 4 hours, or 1.25E-06/hour; it is 
compared to the overall 5-year average for nuclear power 
plant worker accident/injury value of 1.4E-06/hour.  Thus 
the accident/injury risk from the example problem is 
about 89% of the five-year average worker accident rate.  
The example task results pose a quandary; quantification 
shows that the fatality risk of this one example task is
reasonably low but that a single 4-hour task comprises 
almost all of the annual worker accident risk.  It is 
possible that the injury severities have been overestimated 
or that some of the failure rates are conservatively large 
values; both would result in overestimating the risk.  If
further investigation revealed that the failure rates and 
injury severity assessment are reasonable, then other 
means to reduce worker risk should be employed.   
TABLE II.  Worker risk in the US fission industry 
Calendar 
Year
Accidents 
per worker hour 
Fatalities 
per worker hour 
1980 1.05E-05 6.30E-08 
1984 7.50E-06 4.50E-08 
1988 6.70E-06 4.02E-08 
1990 5.15E-06 2.32E-08 
1992 3.85E-06 1.73E-08 
1994 3.20E-06 1.44E-08 
1996 2.30E-06 1.04E-08 
1998 1.45E-06 6.53E-09 
1999 1.70E-06 7.65E-09 
2000 1.30E-06 3.90E-09 
2001 1.20E-06 3.60E-09 
2002 1.10E-06 3.30E-09 
5-yr average ~1.4E-06 ~5E-09 
This table assumes a 2,000 hour work year. 
Data for 2001 and 2002 were taken from the INPO internet site. 
Possible approaches are smart sensors that require less 
frequent calibration,36 such as every two years instead of 
each year, or a digital sensor that can be remotely 
calibrated.  These solutions either reduce or avoid the 
worker ‘at risk’ time in the room.  A risk-benefit analysis 
could address the increased sensor cost versus using the 
traditional sensor with yearly calibration.   
IV.  WE-FMEA LIMITATIONS 
Like every analysis method, the WE-FMEA has 
some limitations.  The first limitation is that there can be 
some types of failure events that may be identified when 
examining the nearby components, but the failure events 
will not have failure rate data readily available.  Some 
events will probably be very rare; they will not have any 
statistical data accumulated.  In those cases, the WE-
FMEA can be used qualitatively to support hazard 
identification, or an effort can be made to estimate or 
bound the required failure rate.  Other events may have 
failure rate data, but as seen in the example, the failure 
rates may be conservatively high – this may be acceptable 
in a system failure fault tree, but not so easily accepted in 
a personnel safety assessment.  Another limitation is that 
assessing personnel injuries is very subjective, depending 
on the physics of a component failure event and the 
physics of energy interaction with a human being.  There 
are a few published guidelines regarding human 
tolerances and injury thresholds, notably aerospace data, 
and the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards for 
automobile passengers, found in 49CFR571.  Such data 
require collection, assessment and development for 
application to the consequence assessment in the WE-
FMEA.  While these institutions and the military have 
studied various aspects of human tolerances and injuries, 
injury prediction is not an exact science; for example, a 
test stand may have found that the force required to 
fracture a human bone is 1.1 kN, but if a smaller force 
from an impact is loaded at a detrimental orientation or at 
a focused point of impact, a bone can still be fractured.  A 
final limitation is that the WE-FMEA is much like its 
parent FMEA, it is a tedious analysis; it is as time 
consuming as a system FMEA and requires a high level of 
knowledge about a variety of components and systems.  
Therefore, the WE-FMEA is not intended for application 
to every maintenance activity, only those activities taking 
place in the most complicated, congested or ‘close 
quarters’ parts of the facility where many types of hazards 
are co-located.  This is a fitting limitation because in less 
congested areas of a facility, the primary hazards of the 
task at hand are expected to dominate the worker risk.   
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
The WE-FMEA is a risk-based analysis tool that can 
support occupational safety assessment for complex work 
environments, such as magnetic or inertial fusion 
experiments, power plants, particle accelerators, or other 
complex, high-technology facilities.  This new analysis 
method provides a systematic framework for assessing 
hazards that are proximate to the given task while existing 
approaches address only the hazards to be found within a 
given task.  The WE-FMEA is to be used in concert with 
existing safety approaches, such as the JHA.  The 
instrument calibration task used as a WE-FMEA example 
has shown that, with appropriate engineering component 
data and human injury data as support information, the 
WE-FMEA can be applied to fusion experiments and 
other facilities to estimate the worker risk from the 
secondary or ‘peripheral’ hazards.  Secondary hazards can 
have the greatest influence on worker safety when the 
workers are following the JHA and adequately protecting 
themselves from the primary hazards of the task.  
Actuarial data from similar industries can serve as points 
of comparison to WE-FMEA results.   
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